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On 4th March 2014, a major Chinese solar energy company, Chaori, shocked the 
financial market.  Its announcement that it was unable to pay the interest of 90 million RMB 
associated with its corporate bonds due in full the following day, made it the country's first 
default in the domestic bond market since 1997. The government did not step in to bail out 
the failing company, sending a clear signal that China's financial reform will start to remove 
the long-standing issues of soft-budget constraints, be it for state-owned or private firms.  
Following the news, the copper price suffered an unexpected drop, pushing its stock 
level higher, and signalling that economic activities may be weakened as a result. Due to its 
strategic importance in the national economy, copper has been used by many investors as 
collateral for bank loans. However, the weakening of the country’s property market and 
RMB in recent months implies that any such financing deals will become significantly less 
profitable.  
With the government's efforts to tighten bank loans and to implement hard budget 
constraints, investors should be prepared for more challenges. If they are unable to secure 
loans, they may need to sell off their metal stocks. This will inevitably lead to more price 
volatilities and a downward pressure on profit margins in the metal trading industry.  
However, given the small size of the company and the relatively stable market 
environment, Chaori's interest payment default is unlikely to trigger any large market 
contagion effect in the short term. Some economists may even argue that perhaps Chaori 
has been used by the government to test the potential impact of its deepening reform 
efforts to reduce overcapacity in certain industries and to allow the financial market to play 
a more important role in improving production efficiency and industrial upgrading. As stated 
by Premier Li Keqiang after the incident, future defaults might be unavoidable as China’s 
economy comes to a turning point and the government is no longer willing to step in to 
support failing companies.   
In April 2014, another small building material company, Xuzhou Zhongsen Tonghao 
New Board Co., failed to pay interest on 180 million RMB of bonds, making it the second 
default on domestic bonds in a matter of only two months. The default by the company was 
also the first in China’s high-yield bond market, which was launched in June 2012 in an 
effort to alleviate the financing difficulties of small and medium-sized private firms. The 
reaction of the market was muted and the Shanghai Composite Index was even up by 0.7% 
on the day. Nevertheless, investors should learn from this incident that taking high risks will 
be their own responsibility and the expectation of any state bailout may lead to an 
unexpected closure. 
Conversely, to improve access to the financial market, in late February 2014 the 
Central Bank revealed details of trans-border RMB regulations in the newly-established 
Shanghai Free Trade Zone (FTZ). Companies set up in the FTZ are permitted to borrow 
offshore RMB without the restraints which prevailed in the past. For example, the Bank of 
Communications Financial Leasing (BCFL) has managed to obtain a 700 million RMB loan 
from Bank of Communications Singapore at an interest rate of less than 4%; significantly 
lower than the mainland lending rate which stood at over 6% at the time. As a result, the 
borrowing costs of companies in the FTZ will be reduced, allowing them to enjoy a much 
lighter financial burden. On the other hand, control measures related to money trafficking 
and the financing of terrorism have also been carefully drafted, showing the government’s 
cautious attitude towards financial liberalization. All these policies are believed to be 
effective in preventing currency and interest arbitrage while assisting the globalization of 
RMB. The FTZ has been created as an experiment to assist the country's ambitious reform 
programme which may be rolled out to the rest of the country in the foreseeable future. 
During the 2nd annual conference of the 12th National People's Congress (NPC) in 
March 2014, two new important financial and monetary reforms were announced by the 
central government. After the removal of the floor on the bank lending rate in July 2013, the 
central government further removed the ceilings on smaller foreign currency deposits in the 
Shanghai Free Trade Zone (FTZ). In addition, since last October, China has launched a prime 
interest rate for commercial bank loans. Instead of relying on the benchmark rate as a 
guideline for lending, the new prime rate is based on the weighted average rate of the nine 
biggest domestic commercial banks’ loans to their best corporate customers. Although this 
move will not fully eliminate government intervention, it has given key Chinese lenders 
more say in the determination of lending rates. All these new policies have been used to 
test market reactions so as to set up a solid foundation for full-scale interest rate 
liberalisation in the country. It is widely believed that as early as next year, China will scrap 
the ceiling on bank deposit rates to realise full interest rate marketization.  
The other reform is of the country’s controversial exchange rate regime. Since 17th 
March 2014, the daily fluctuation range of RMB foreign exchange rate has been allowed to 
double from 1% to 2%. The last such relinquishing of the tightly controlled exchange rate 
band was in April 2012, when the PBOC doubled its daily trading band from 0.5% to 1%. This 
is a major step in further reforming the foreign exchange regime and making the yuan more 
competitive as a trading instrument on the world stage. Market participants have long 
anticipated a constant one-way appreciation of the currency. The new policy shifts market 
expectation by allowing a two-way wider band. The increased flexibility will improve market 
efficiency and increase the decisive role played by the market in resource allocation. While 
on the other hand, companies in China - facing greater volatility in the yuan’s exchange rate 
- will have to learn how to manage their currency risks effectively.  
Zhou Xiaochuan, governor of China's Central Bank, has made it clear that financial 
sector reform in China may be faster and deeper than generally expected. An official report 
at the recent NPC revealed a series of key proposals for the deepening of financial reform, 
including the introduction of a bank deposit insurance system, a plan to allow the private 
sector to set up small and medium-sized banks and other financial institutions, and a move 
to allow local governments to issue bonds.  
Along with the further opening up of China’s financial system, it is necessary to 
reassure bank depositors that their savings are safe. At the moment, only deposits with the 
“Big Four” banks are implicitly backed up by the central government, leaving smaller banks 
less attractive to depositors. The introduction of the insurance system has offered a safety 
net, giving the banks more power in interest rate setting, while on the other hand, sending a 
strong signal to the market that banks could fail. This could in turn stimulate market 
competition, pushing the banks to become stronger and more resilient to external 
volatilities.    
Additionally, to ease the restrictions in the banking sector, ten private companies 
including Alibaba and Tencent were, since March 2014, allowed to set up private banks. As 
with other banks they must comply with the same set of banking regulations, but their main 
focus is on serving small and micro businesses. Currently, private investment only accounts 
for about 11-12% of the total assets of the Chinese banking industry. This move will 
inevitably loosen the government’s control over the sector, allowing the market to play a 
bigger role in resource allocation.  
  Finally, to activate China’s capital markets and to ease the financing difficulties of 
local governments, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) has given 
the green light to local government bond sales in 2014. Currently, local governments mainly 
rely on land sales and Special Purpose Investment Vehicles (SPIVs), set up by local 
authorities such as Trust and Investment Companies (TICs), to meet their spending needs. 
Problems of revenue shortage at the local level have become even more serious, in 
particular after the world financial crisis. According to the latest audit, by 2013, local 
government debts were about RMB 17.7 trillion ($2.9bn), an increase of 70% from three 
years previously. Although the aggregate amount remains low compared with other 
developed nations, its speed of growth is worrisome. It is widely expected that the 
allowance of direct bond sales at the local level will phase out the opaque financing vehicles 
used by local governments and make the embedded risks more transparent. Over the long 
term, the establishment of a thriving municipal bond market would be the only solution for 
China to diversify the risks to a wider pool of potential investors.   
Although it is currently hard to project the precise timeline for the full-scale 
implementation of these reforms, it is clear that the government is determined to increase 
market competition, to reduce the monopoly power of the state sector, and to restrain 
government intervention in the financial market.  
China's new Prime Minister, Li Keqiang, considers market reform to be a dividend to 
sustain the country's economic growth and prosperity. The deepening reform methods to 
be implemented in the financial sector will enforce this message.  
